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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

AS A MATTER OF FACT: REASSERTING THE ROLE OF BASIC
FACTS IN VETERANS COURT JURISPRUDENCE
JEFFREY D. PARKER*
“There is nothing I know of so sublime as a fact.”
– George Canning 1
ABSTRACT
Unique to legal literature, this article outlines the most basic and unsexy
nature of fact finding at the lowest tribunal – what is decided by a lower tribunal
after weighing the different stories and conflicting evidence, and after deciding
which story to believe or which evidence has more value. While legal holdings
and precedents are much more engaging to the legal mind, such legal “holdings”
are heavily dependent upon the basic facts found for support. A legal rule
without supporting facts is mere dicta, while a legal rule squarely derived from
the facts forms a legal precedent.
This article identifies several logical errors and predispositions that
appellate courts may be prone to that alter the deference owed to the lower
court’s most basic fact finding. The article focuses specifically in administrative
law, and more specifically Department of Veterans Affairs decisions, providing
illustrations of US Court of Veterans Appeals (Veterans Court) fact deference
errors.

* Jeffrey Parker is a Veterans Law Judge who serves our nation’s veterans at the Board of Veterans’
Appeals in Washington, D.C. Judge Parker is a veteran of service, having practiced criminal and
administrative law as a Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy Judge Advocate Generals Corps during the
Persian Gulf Era. The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), or
the U.S. Government.
1. CHARLES NOEL DOUGLAS, FORTY THOUSAND QUOTATIONS 675 (Sully & Kleintrich eds.,
1917 ed., 1904).
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Everyone knows what a fact is, but not everyone respects the facts they
know. There is currently an ongoing erosion of the solidity of facts in popular
culture. 2 Such trends in philosophy, cultural morality, and public forum
discussions are knocking at the doorstep of the law. 3 While lawyers and judges
are doubly qualified—first as a lay person, and then by legal training—to know
what a fact is, as humans they are still susceptible to human preconceptions 4 and
logical error. 5
This Article illustrates some logical fallacies employed in both precedential
and nonprecedential decisions 6 of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(Veterans Court or CAVC)7 that affect its fact deference toward decisions of the
Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board). 8 The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
2. One only need to glance at the news or popular culture to see frequent references to phrases
such as “alternative facts,” “fact checking,” “post-truth,” and “truth decay.” See, e.g., Sarah C.
Haan, Facebook’s Alternative Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 18, 18 (2019); JENNIFER
KAVANAGH & MICHAEL D. RICH, TRUTH DECAY: AN INITIAL EXPLORATION OF THE DIMINISHING
ROLE OF FACTS AND ANALYSIS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 1, 116, 263 (2018); OXFORD
DICTIONARIES WORD OF THE YEAR 2016, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year
/word-of-the-year-2016 (last visited Apr. 7, 2019) (“Post-truth,” an adjective defined as “relating
to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion
than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”).
3. Allison Orr Larsen, Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
175, 180 (2018) (“There are new forces at work that should make us concerned that the same disease
plaguing today’s political dialogue will infect (or further infect) the judiciary.”).
4. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409, 414 n.4 (1792) (“[W]e well know how liable the best
minds are, notwithstanding their utmost care, to a bias, which may arise from a pre-conceived
opinion, even unguardedly, much more deliberately, given…”).
5. James D. Ridgway et al., “Not Reasonably Debatable”: The Problems with Single-Judge
Decisions by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 54 (2016)
(“Judges are human and, as such, are susceptible to cognitive bias and motivated reasoning. Indeed,
whether driven by ideology or not, an inherent feature of appellate judging is that the same language
can be interpreted differently and lead to different outcomes, particularly when it involves some
subjective element.”); see Kevin W. Saunders, Informal Fallacies in Legal Argumentation, 44 S.C.
L. REV. 343, 345 (1993) (discussing a general overview of typical informal fallacies in legal
reasoning).
6. This Article addresses decisions of the Veterans Court by way of illustration, citing a few
precedents as a caution that improper fact deference may make its way even into precedent. The
cases were not selected by any systematic or comprehensive review of Veterans Court decisions,
precedential or nonprecedential, so this Article draws no larger conclusions as the extent of such
nondeference.
7. The Veterans Court is an Article I Court established by Congress by the Veterans’ Judicial
Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105, and began issuing decisions in 1990.
The Veterans Court has limited jurisdiction over decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. See
38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a)-(c), 7261(c)-(d) (2018). Limited aspects of decisions of the Veterans Court
are reviewed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c)-(e) (2018).
8. Board of Veterans Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.bva.va.gov
(last visited Dec. 17, 2018). The Board of Veterans’ Appeals is the highest adjudicative agency
within the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). See 38 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2018); Board of
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(VA) and the Veterans Court are each charged with well-defined roles in
providing or insuring a fair compensation system that maximizes veterans’
benefits according to statute, regulations, and delegated legal authorities—a
system which provides its own generous legal standards that favor veterans. 9
Examining the very nature of the basic or “historical” fact, an area of legal
literature that has drawn little focus, 10 this Article excludes discussion of other
types of facts, 11 and only addresses mixed questions of law and fact to illustrate
how the fact within the mixed question is still owed deference. The fact
deference errors of the Veterans Court identified in this Article include outcome
preference, misstatement of facts, overshadowing of fact by emphasis on law,
relitigating facts through the reasons and bases requirement, holdings that lack
factual support, lifting facts out of context, and ad hominem attacks on the
agency.
The conclusion is an appeal to the Veterans Court to review its own fact
deference practices in order to avoid relitigating the same facts, creating unclear
precedents, and trading in its role as legal guide for short-term changes in case
outcomes. Application of clear error review versus reasons and bases remand
will benefit veterans by providing actual appellate review by a judge of the
Veterans Court, and will finalize more decisions, ultimately reducing backlog, 12
Veterans Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.bva.va.gov (last visited Dec.
17, 2018).
9. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2018) (“When there is an approximate balance of positive and
negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall
give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.”).
10. A discussion focused on administrative agency fact-finding is rarely the focus in the legal
literature as it seems so unattractive compared to purely legal themes, mixed law-fact recognition
questions, and trendy policy and law themes. See Evan D. Bernick, Is Judicial Deference to Agency
Fact-Finding Unlawful?, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 27 (2018) (“[A]lthough longstanding
administrative law doctrines that command judges to defer to agency interpretations of statutes and
regulations have received intense academic and judicial scrutiny in recent years, fact deference has
received comparatively little attention.”).
11. Similar sounding phrases that are not the subject of this Article because they are different
concepts include “error in fact” (when a court gives a judgment or verdict and does not know of a
fact) and “mistake of fact” (a legal obligation does not occur because a fact is forgotten or ignored
by a court). This Article is also not about “legislative” facts (general facts that help the tribunal
decide questions of law and policy and discretion). This Article does not stray into the moral zone
of “truth” because, while truth is built on fact, it also involves a value question. While there may
be some parallels between a lower administrative body fact-finding and fact-finding by a jury, this
Article recognizes the parallels are imperfect. See Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State &
Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 11, 28 (1994) (“juries do not ordinarily make specific
findings of fact . . . juries typically make only legal conclusions.”).
12. James D. Ridgway & David Ames, Misunderstanding Chenery and the Problem of
Reasons-or-Bases Review, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 303, 305–06 (2018) (“[T]he [Veterans Court]
ought to abandon reasons-or-bases review as it is currently practiced in favor of a traditional
approach to appellate review of fact-finding” of adjudicative fact for clear error because the current
approach is “dramatically increasing the time it takes to resolve claims.”).
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by either upholding or reversing the decision re-adjudications, and wait times
for veterans.
I. DISTINCT ROLES OF THE VETERANS COURT (APPELLATE BODY) AND
THE BOARD (AGENCY)
“Peace has its victories, but it takes brave men and women to win
them.”
– Ralph Waldo Emerson 13
A grateful nation remembers its veterans who took on the risks and
responsibilities for protection of their fellow citizens and country. There are no
more worthy recipients than disabled veterans to which such care and
compensation should be provided.
The conscious and statutory mission of the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) is to care for those veterans of service, including by providing a
wide array of disability compensation and other compensatory benefits to
disabled veterans. 14 The VA is charged with assisting veterans and developing
evidence, then fairly weighing that evidence to make fair findings of fact that
maximize disability compensation for veterans. 15
On the other hand, the Veterans Court has oversight authority of the VA
disability compensation system that assures the system provides due process,
complies with legal authority, and uses fair reasoning to support decisions for
veterans. 16 The Veterans Court has the authority to rule on VA legal authorities,
and to make binding legal precedents for future cases when doing so. 17
Finding specific facts in a particular case is not within the Veterans Court’s
jurisdiction. 18 The Veterans Court is required to defer to VA on basic factfinding, leaving the Veterans Court free to give precedential legal guidance for
future cases. 19

13. Ralph Waldo Emerson Quotes, GOODREADS, INC., https://www.goodreads.com/quotes
/4729-whatever-you-do-you-need-courage-whatever-course-you-decide (last visited May. 1,
2021).
14. See DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS, DEPENDENTS
AND SURVIVORS iii (2018).
15. For elaboration of VA disability benefits, benefit maximizing provisions of the rating
schedule that VA uses to compensate disabilities, and generous legal provisions, see Jeffrey Parker,
Getting the Train Back on Track: Legal Principles to Guide Extra-schedular Referrals in VA
Disability Rating Claims, 28, FED. CIR. B.J. 175, 177, 189 (2019).
16. Id. at 176–77, 197.
17. Id. at 205.
18. Id. at 206.
19. Id.
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II. THE NATURE OF FACTS
“I keep six honest serving-men
(They taught me all I knew);
Their names are What and Why and When
And How and Where and Who.”
– Rudyard Kipling 20
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a fact is a “thing done; an action
performed or an [i]ncident transpiring; an event or circumstance; an actual
occurrence.” 21 Facts go about quietly supporting the law and are so easily
overshadowed by the more engaging intellectual attractions of the law.
A lay person knows what a fact is. A lay person can tell you that Uncle Joe
fell from a ladder two months ago, injured his hip, and went by ambulance to
the hospital, where doctors diagnosed a hip fracture. A lay witness can tell you
that, on March 21st at 9:25 A.M., while driving west on Franconia Avenue in a
blue pickup truck, the defendant ran the red light, struck the plaintiff, then left
the scene of the accident. These observable actions, events, or occurrences are
basic facts.
The most basic facts, which materialize in law as findings of fact, have been
variously described in the law as “historical facts” or “established facts,” 22 “pure
finding of fact,” 23 “primary” facts, 24 “objective facts,” 25 “material facts,” 26
20. RUDYARD KIPLING, JUST SO STORIES 62 (1998).
21. Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/fact/ (last visited Apr. 19,
2021).
22. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982) (referencing facts found as
“historical facts” or “established facts” when defining mixed questions of law and fact).
23. David E. Boelzner, In Sight, It Must Be Right: Judicial Review of VA Decision for Reasons
and Bases vs. Clear Error, 17 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 681, 687 (2014) (“[P]ure finding of fact, i.e.
what occurred, will often involve [circumstantial evidence and] the exercise of reason”).
24. Daniel Solomon, Identifying and Understanding Standards of Review,THE WRITING CTR.
AT GEO. UNIV. L. CTR. 1, 5 (2013), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09
/Identifying-and-Understanding-Standards-of-Review.pdf (explaining that “historical” facts are
synonymous with “basic” facts or “primary” facts). For a distinction between “primary facts” and
“ultimate facts,” which are conclusions from the evidence see Thomas J. Poche, Administrative
Law—Substantial Evidence on the Record Considered as a Whole, 12 LA. L. REV. 290, 295 (1952)
(“Testimony and other evidence are the proof from which the primary facts are inferred. Primary
facts are the proof from which ultimate facts are inferred.” “[T]he ultimate facts found by an agency
are the ultimate conclusions inferred from the evidence.”).
25. Larsen, supra note 4, at 177; Charles H. Koch, Jr., An Issue-Driven Strategy for Review of
Agency Decisions, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 511, 524 (1991) (defining fact as “something done or having
existence or information with objective reality.”).
26. Material Fact, THE LAW DICTIONARY, https://thelawdictionary.org/material-fact (last
visited Apr. 15, 2019) (defining “material fact” as one that is “[c]rucial to the interpretation of a
phenomenon or a subject matter, or to the determination of an issue at hand this is a specific type
of confirmed or validated event, item of information, or state of affairs.).
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“adjudicative facts,” 27 “specific facts,” 28 and “true facts” or “substantive
truth.” 29 These are different descriptions of the same concept, hereinafter
referred to simply as basic facts.
Basic facts arise in a legal context. Many legal conclusions are primarily
determined by findings of basic facts. The underlying basic facts are still owed
great deference by the Veterans Court. For example, in veterans law, the
relevance, 30 credibility, 31 and weight 32 of evidence are examples of such mixed
fact-law questions. Other examples of veterans law mixed questions that are
decided by the specific facts of a case are service connection, 33 the effective

27. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942) (explaining that adjudicative facts cover “what the parties did,
what the circumstances were, [and] what the background conditions were.”); Koch, supra note 25,
at 525 n. 84 (“When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties—who did
what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent—the court or agency is performing an
adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts.”) (quoting 2 K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 15.03 (1958)).
28. Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 UNIV. OF CHI. L.
REV. 643, 654 (2015) (“[C]ase-specific facts” are known as “adjudicative facts”).
29. See Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial FactFinding – Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, CORNELL LAW FACULTY
PUBLICATIONS 497, 498 (1999), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=2388&context=facpub. “True facts” are defined in distinction from “formal legal truth,” which is
“whatever is found as fact by the legal fact-finder, whether it accords with substantive truth or not.”
Id.
30. See Abels v. Wilkie, No. 2018-1484, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 4441, at *8 (Fed. Cir. Feb.
14, 2019) (holding that “the Veterans Court had engaged in improper appellate factfinding when it
found that certain medical records were not relevant”); cf. Sullivan v. McDonald, 815 F.3d 786,
792 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
31. Smith v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 235, 237–38 (1991) (“Credibility is determined by the
fact finder . . . . [The] Court cannot determine the credibility of a veteran’s sworn testimony.
Determination of credibility is a function for the [Board].”).
32. Washington v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 362, 369 (2005) (recognizing that weighing
medical opinions involves fact-finding by properly declining the opportunity to weigh a potentially
corroborating medical opinion that the Board failed to discuss) (“we are unwilling to make the
initial judgment concerning the weight to be given to [a medical statement] . . . we will avoid
expressing an opinion on the appropriate corroborative weight the Board should have given to [the
medical opinion].”).
33. See Dyment v. West, 13 Vet. App. 141, 144 (1999) (holding that a finding of service
connection, or no service connection, involves a weighing of evidence, and is a finding of fact that
the court reviews under the “clearly erroneous” standard).
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dates for VA benefits, 34 disability ratings, 35 and the duties to notify and assist a
veteran-appellant. 36
III. CLEAR ERROR STANDARD OF APPELLATE FACT REVIEW
“[O]nce—many, many years ago…I thought I made a wrong decision.
Of course, it turned out that I had been right all along. But I was wrong
to have thought that I was wrong.”
– John Foster Dulles 37
The Board and the Veterans Court each have statutorily defined and limited
jurisdictions. 38 The different legal standards accorded findings of fact versus
legal holdings parallel the unique tasks allotted between the lower administrative
body (the Board) and the appellate court (the Veterans Court). 39
As applied to the VA, there are two levels of fact-finding adjudication—first
at a Regional Office (RO), then appealed cases are decided by the Board, which

34. Evans v. West, 12 Vet. App. 396, 401 (1999) (recognizing that the assignment of an
effective date is a finding of fact that will not be overturned unless the court finds it to be clearly
erroneous).
35. Webster v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 155, 159 (1990) (“Because we are a [c]ourt of review,
it is not appropriate for us to make a de novo finding, based on the evidence, of the appellant’s
degree of impairment.”), cited in Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263–64 (2000); Kuppamala v.
McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 447, 454 (2015) (“[E]xtraschedular consideration is not a question of
opinion or discretion, but one of fact…Clearly, this is a fact-driven analysis assessing a veteran’s
unique disability picture and whether that picture results in an average impairment in earning
capacity significant enough to warrant an extraschedular rating.”).
36. See Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328, 1335 (2006) (citing Veterans Court cases for
the proposition that Veterans Court decisions “have consistently treated the question of whether a
particular notice is sufficient to satisfy the notification requirements of [38 U.S.C. § 5103(a)] as
factual.”).
37. HENRI TEMIANKA, FACING THE MUSIC 190 (1973).
38. See 38 U.S.C. § § 7104, 7252.
39. When creating the Veterans Court, the Senate Committee Report explained that its
standard for reviewing facts found by the Board “is intended to afford the maximum possible
deference to the [Board]’s expertise as an arbiter of the specialized types of factual issues that arise
in the context of claims for VA benefits, while still recognizing and providing for the possibility of
error in [Board] factual determination . . .” S. REP. NO. 100-418, at 60 (1988); JAMES D. RIDGWAY,
VETERANS LAW: CASES AND THEORY 737 (2015); see Johnston v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 80, 84
(1997); Cromley v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 376, 378 (1995); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53
(1990); see Quintero v. Wilkie, No. 18-0255, 2019 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 527, at *9 (Vet.
App. Apr. 2, 2019) (showing an example of careful application of clear error deference as to one
part of the issue and less formally, but accurately, restating the clear error standard.) (“If one were
sitting as the initial decisionmaker, it might be possible to have reached a different conclusion. But
that is not what the Court does at this stage in the process. It reviews what the Board did.”); Amanda
J. Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
233, 240 (2009) (“The standard of review, in theory at least, works to balance the unique strengths
each court possesses.”).
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is the highest-level fact finder within the VA. 40 Administrative agencies such as
the Board have been traditionally recognized for their expertise 41 in developing
and deciding factual questions 42 because of their specialized training and
practical experience reviewing similar types of evidence and the same legal
questions. 43
The Board first finds basic facts, then applies these basic facts to legal
criteria to make an ultimate conclusion on the legal question. 44 This results in a
“mixed question” of fact and law. 45 The Board is the expert fact-finder, and clear
error deference is still owed the basic facts tucked within the Board decision’s
ultimate legal conclusions. 46
After the Board has weighed the evidence, found facts, and applied the facts
to the law, the case may be appealed to the Veterans Court, an Article I Court 47
with jurisdiction that requires clear error deference to fact-finding, 48 no

40. Elkins v. Gober, 229 F.3d 1369, 1377 (2000). As only Board decisions are directly
appealed to the Veterans Court, the case law speaks primarily in terms of deference to Board
decision. See Id. (“Fact-finding in veterans cases is to be done by the expert [Board], not by the
Veterans Court.”).
41. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam) (explaining that one reason new issues
should be heard first at the lowest level is so that the lower-level decision maker “[can] bring its
expertise to bear upon the matter; can evaluate the evidence; can make an initial determination;
and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a [higher] court later
determine whether its decision” is appropriate).
42. Koch, supra note 25, at 530 (“The agencies are superior fact gatherers and hence the courts
should do little monitoring of fact-gathering.”).
43. Id. at 531.
44. The Board is charged by statute with both basic fact-finding and mixed question findings.
See 38 U.S.C. § 7104 (“Jurisdiction of the Board. (d) Each decision of the Board shall include—
(1) a written statement of the Board’s findings and conclusions, and the reasons or bases for those
findings and conclusions, on all material issues of fact and law presented on the record . . .”).
45. Id.
46. Boelzner, supra note 23, at 685.
47. 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (establishing under Article I of the U.S. Constitution “the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims”).
48. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4) (2018) (“[I]n the case of a finding of material fact adverse to the
claimant [the Veterans Court may] hold unlawful and set aside or reverse such finding if the finding
is clearly erroneous.”); 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) (2018) (“In no event shall findings of fact made by the
Secretary or the Board of Veterans’ Appeals be subject to trial de novo by the [Veterans Court].”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court’s
opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”); Shira A. Scheindlin, Judicial Fact-Finding and
the Trial Court Judge, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 367, 371 (2015) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6))
(stating that the standard of appellate review of fact-finding is a clearly erroneous showing that the
trial judge made a clear error in the finding of fact. The standard of review is supposed to be very
deferential because the trial judge heard the witnesses and determined credibility).
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deference to legal interpretations, 49 and minimal deference for other mixed
questions of law and fact. 50 Clear error arises when there is a “definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has occurred.” 51 Maintaining this fact-law
distinction, 52 and properly applying the respective legal standards to each, is the
challenge presented to the Veterans Court. 53
In one early precedent of Ashmore v. Derwinski, 54 the early Veterans Court
pioneered veterans’ law from scratch, carefully selecting cases in which the facts
supported the rule of law holding made on those facts. 55 In another early
precedent of Young v. Derwinski, 56 the Veterans Court held that there was “no
plausible basis in the record” for the Board’s findings that the veteran actually
signed and mailed a letter. The Veterans Court went out of its way to show the
extent of the evidence that supported (was “not inconsistent with”) the Board’s
factual findings. 57 While the early Veterans Court honestly handled the facts, it
also delved deep into the facts of the case. 58 Although this may have been an
innocent foray into whether the case needed guidance, it is one that invited

49. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(1) (2018) (providing that the Veterans Court shall “decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions, and determine the
meaning or applicability of the terms of an action” of VA).
50. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3) (2018) (providing that for other decisions and findings of the VA,
the Veterans Court reviews under an “arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law” standard).
51. See Andino v. Nicholson, 498 F.3d 1370, 1373 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (elaborating on the
“clear error” standard with a summary of U.S. Supreme Court cases).
52. Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the Formula for Judicial Review: The Law-Fact Distinction, 5
INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 58 (2010). (“[The law-fact distinction is] ill-defined . . . .
The restriction on review most affects cases whose dispositions typically turn on the resolution of
factual issues . . . . If their claims are factual rather than legal, the law precludes federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction, leaving the agency as the final arbiter.”).
53. See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1871–72 (1966) (illustrating the difficulties that courts struggle with when
trying to define and maintain the law-fact distinction).
For example, the judge may declare that a master is liable for a tort committed by a servant
acting within the scope of his employment. The jury may reconstruct the servant’s acts
which culminated in the commission of the tort. But in addition to the resolution of these
questions, the decision will have to be made whether such a tort was within the scope of the
servant’s employment.
Id.
54. 1 Vet. App. 580, 583 (1991) (noting that the Board “listed with care the findings” of a VA
examination, and relied on the Board’s “listing of supportive clinical findings” to support the
Board’s finding that disability was mild, and not severe).
55. Id. at 583–84.
56. 2 Vet. App. 59, 61–62 (1992) (“the [Board]’s findings are not inconsistent with the
veteran’s separation agreement, divorce decree, and will.”).
57. Id. at 61.
58. Id at 60–61.
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subsequent Veterans Court panels and individual judges to continue to delve
deeply into the facts of a case. 59
The Veterans Court’s precedents demonstrate that, in the main, it has stated
and purports to apply clear error deference to Board fact-finding on a variety of
legal questions, even though it has rarely done so in factually close cases where
clear error deference would be tested. 60 Instead, many of the Veterans Court’s
holdings stating clear error deference to Board fact-finding are cases where the
facts are clearly against the appellant and, therefore, easily support the Board’s
findings of fact, such that clear error deference was never tested. 61
For examples of where subsequent Veterans Courts made precedent when
the facts of the case were overwhelmingly against the appellant, see the
precedent of Burden v. Shinseki, 62 which held that the Board’s findings that the
veteran was not married were “not clearly erroneous.” 63 The underlying facts of
the case show that the veteran asserted at least sixteen times that he was not
married, that he was divorced, and that there were multiple other inconsistencies
with the purported spouse’s stories. 64 In Elias v. Brown, 65 while the Veterans
Court affirmed a Board decision, the only evidence in support of the appellant’s
claim consisted of two legally incompetent lay statements that had no probative
value. 66 In Miller v. Shulkin, 67 where the Veterans Court upheld the Board’s
finding that a rating in excess of the schedular maximum rating of 10% for
neurological symptoms was not warranted, the facts directed only one outcome
of higher rating. 68
It is hard to find a Veterans Court precedent where the facts as found by the
Board were a close call, such that the clear error deference standard actually
directed the court’s holding. Instead, most factually close cases are remanded by
the Veterans Court for additional reasons, based on the explanations by the
Board. 69

59. See generally Elias v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 259, 261–62 (1997).
60. See generally Young, 2 Vet. App at 61.
61. See generally Burden v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 178, 188.
62. Id. at 187–88.
63. Id. at 188.
64. Id. at 187.
65. Elias v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 259, 259 (1997).
66. Id. at 263–64.
67. 28 Vet. App. 376 (2017).
68. Id. at 381; see also Urban v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 82 (2017) (showing that the Board
decided that the co-existing asthma warranted the higher 60% rating, while the co-existing
obstructive sleep apnea warranted only a 50% rating. The Veterans Court upheld the Board’s
favorable selection of the asthma, with the higher 60% rating, as the predominant respiratory
disability, as well as the finding that the asthma was properly rated.)
69. Ridgway et al., supra note 6.
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I. UN-FACTS: TECHNIQUES AND FALLACIES THAT DIMINISH FACTS
“Facts matter not at all. Perception is everything. It’s certainty.”
– Stephen Colbert70
This article assumes the best motives by the Veterans Court in its attempts
to sort cases and apply proper judicial deference to the component parts of the
case. If the illustrations in this Article show Veterans Court derivation from full
deference to Board fact-finding, it would not be from an assumption of bad
motive; to the contrary, it is assumed to be from too much of a good motive.
Like the VA, the Veterans Court is concerned about the welfare of veterans and
assuring the VA disability compensation system is maximizing benefits. 71 These
concerns might suggest to the Veterans Court that its primary goal is to aim for
a better compensation outcome in each case before it, rather than reviewing the
Board decisions only for clear error.
The Veterans Court has delineated the proper legal standards of deference
owed for its jurisprudence, 72 pursuant to the requirement that the Veterans Court
state the standard of review it applies. 73 The challenge to the Veterans Court is
to consistently apply the clear error deference standard to Board fact-finding. 74
70. Interview by Nathan Rabin with Stephen Colbert, Host, The Colbert Report (Jan. 25,
2006).
71. See A.B. v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 35, 38 (1993) (presuming a veteran is seeking the highest
compensation); Bradley v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 280 (2008); Buie v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 242,
250 (2011) (recognizing special monthly compensation benefits may still be available in some cases
where a veteran is already receiving a 100 percent rating); Copeland v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App.
333, 338 (2015) (stating that the VA “[s]ecretary has, through various regulations, created
procedural mechanisms to account for all symptoms and effects arising from service-connected
conditions.”); Morgan v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 162, 167 (2019) (stating that the “VA has powerful,
ready-made schedular rating tools” to use to maximize benefits).
72. See Medrano v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 165, 169 (2007) (showing an examples of the
Veterans Court’s accurate statement of the legal standards to the applied to Board fact-finding).
The Court reviews the Board’s factual findings under the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of
review. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4). ‘A factual finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ Hersey v. Derwinski, 2
Vet. App. 91, 94 (1992) (quoting United States v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948)). The Court may not substitute its judgment for the factual determinations of the
Board on issues of material fact merely because the Court would have decided those issues
differently in the first instance. See id.
Id. “[The Veterans Court] stated the role of this Court is not to make findings of fact, but to ascertain
whether the findings made by the Board evidence clear error. The Board’s findings constitute clear
error only where they are not supported by a plausible basis in the record.” Cooper v. Brown, 6
Vet. App. 450, 452 (1994) (citing Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990)).
73. Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 56.
74. Ridgway et al., supra note 6 (stating that the Veterans Court’s single-judge authority has
resulted in “unacceptable variance in how supposedly established law is applied to the appeals of
veterans seeking benefits.”).
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Maintaining the Veterans Court’s appellate role requires it not to engage in
suggestions offered before it that the VA is biased against claimants, or
presuppositions that the Board decisions lack proper reasoning and legal
analysis, as such predispositions would disincline the Veterans Court toward
deference to VA and the Board’s expertise in handling and weighing the
evidence. This Article identifies several such enticements toward nondeference.
A.

Choosing Outcome Over Limited Jurisdiction
“The province of the [C]ourt is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers,
perform duties in which they have a discretion.”
– John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison 75

The Veterans Court must balance the need to provide meaningful case
review with the statutory requirement to provide very great (clear error)
deference to the Board’s findings of fact. 76 The Veterans Court’s appellate
jurisdiction is limited to “the record of the proceedings before the Secretary and
the Board.” 77 Freed from having to relitigate facts, the Veteran’s Court can
expend its energies and resources providing legal interpretation and guidance. 78
There is a strain of thought among the Veterans Court that the court is more
analogous to an Article III Court, 79 which has broad authorities that include the
taking of life, liberty, and property, as well as other inherent equitable judicial
powers to tailor a remedy where law and regulation provide no remedy. 80
However, the specialized Article I Veterans Court, which was created by
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
76. Boelzner, supra note 23 at 681, 689 (“[P]ure finding of fact, i.e. what occurred, will often
involve [circumstantial evidence and] the exercise of reason.”).
77. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a)-(b); see also Henderson v. Shinseki, 589 F.3d 1201, 1212 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“[T]he Veterans Court reviews each case that comes before it on a record that is limited to
the record developed before the RO and the Board.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Henderson
ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131
S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
78. Peters, supra note 39, at 235.
When used properly, standards of review require appellate judges to exercise self-restraint
and in so doing, act to create a more respected and consistent body of appellate law and a
more efficient judicial system. When judges manipulate the standard of review’s scope, or
ignore its underlying purpose, an inconsistent and unreliable body of law results.
Id. (citing Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 418 (2007)
(“[R]eviewing courts [must] exercise self-restraint in the use of their reversal power.”)).
79. See Taylor v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 147, 159 (2019) (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (showing
the belief that the Veterans Court has Article III powers) (“We have a duty to properly examine
through our inherent constitutional power to apply equitable remedies where Congress has not
expressly authorized a result.); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power extends
to all cases, in law and equity. . .”).
80. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2, cl. 1.
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Congress in 1988 and placed under the auspices of Congress to legally guide the
VA’s distribution of veterans benefits, has a more limited jurisdiction. 81
Stepping out of its jurisdictional constraints has earned the Veterans Court the
occasional reminder by the Federal Circuit Court that it is not an Article III
Court, but rather, it is an Article I Court of limited and specialized jurisdiction
that is specifically delineated by statute. 82 To the extent the Veterans Court
prefers an outcome in a case, in order to reach that outcome, it may be tempted
to provide less deference to facts found by the Board. 83
B.

Misstating or Mischaracterizing the Agency’s Findings of Fact
“Facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our
inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of
facts and evidence.”
– John Adams, The Portable John Adams 84

There is a difference between the Veterans Court misunderstanding some
nuance within fact-finding versus recharacterizing or omitting facts found by the
Board. The latter is suspected when the purported “holding” of the case would
be mere dicta but-for the recharacterized or omitted facts.
In the Veterans Court precedent of Fountain v. McDonald, the Board had
weighed the evidence and found as a fact that “[s]ymptoms of tinnitus were not

81. See Frank Q. Nebeker, Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Veterans Appeals:
Searching Out the Limits, 46 ME. L. REV. 5, 8 (1994).
82. Sullivan v. McDonald, 815 F.3d 786, 793 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e urge the Veterans Court
to be mindful of its jurisdictional limits and refrain from engaging in factfinding when applying the
proper statutory and regulatory framework as outlined in this opinion.”).
This court’s decision in Sullivan v. McDonald, supra, is on point. There, the court held that
the Veterans Court had engaged in improper appellate factfinding when it found that certain
medical records were not relevant, an issue that the Board in that case had not considered.
Sullivan, 815 F.3d at 792. The same analysis applies here.
Abels v. Wilkie, No. 2018-1484, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 4441, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 14, 2019).
83. Peters, supra note 39, at 266 (“Judges who attempt to force what is in their view an
equitable result must artfully maneuver their way around the appropriate standard of review and
the constraints it imposes.”); Kunsch, supra note 12, at 40 (“Appellate courts often avoid the
constraints imposed upon them by the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard by finding the issue under
consideration something other than one of pure fact” (citing Susan R. Petito, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate Fact Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous
Rule been Clearly Erroneous?, 52 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 68, 87-90 (1977))); Masur & Ouellette, supra
note 28, at 699 (stating that courts can generate “deference mistakes,” one type of which is
“asymmetric” deference when “legal issues sometimes reach appellate courts under a more
deferential standard that always favors one type of party.”).
84. John Adams Quotes, GOODREADS, INC., https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/32621facts-are-stubborn-things-and-whatever-may-be-our-wishes [https://perma.cc/9FVL-QQRL] (last
visited June 1, 2021).
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chronic in service and have not been continuous since service separation.” 85
These findings of fact in the negative by the Board in Fountain, if left standing,
would have precluded the Veterans Court from making its holding in this case,
namely, that tinnitus is one of the “chronic” diseases that require application of
chronic disease presumptive service connection provisions. 86 In this case, the
Board had in fact weighed evidence for and against the element of continuous
post-service tinnitus symptoms, including assessment of credibility of reasons
proffered for not reporting symptoms, before finding as a fact that the symptom
of tinnitus had not been continuous since service—a finding of fact that
precludes presumptive service-connection in the case. 87
Using a reasons and bases deficiency, the Fountain court speculated that the
veteran’s tinnitus could have been both present and unnoticed—logically
incompatible concepts that are precluded by the Veterans Court’s own precedent
recognizing that a veteran is fully capable of recognizing tinnitus 88 and that if a
person does not recognize this symptom then, necessarily, the person does not
have the symptom. 89 Fountain introduced its own inference (that, somehow, the
85. 27 Vet. App. 258 (2015); see Docket No. 12-23 753, https://www.va.gov/vetapp13/Files1
/1302973.txt (last visited Nov. 25, 2020). As Fountain was adjudicated by the Board prior to
Walker v. Shinseki, (which restricted chronic disease presumptions to the list of disabilities at 38
C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (2018)), the Board had erred in the veteran’s favor by applying the chronic disease
legal presumptions in Fountain. See Docket No. 12-23 753, https://www.va.gov/vetapp13/Files1
/1302973.txt (last visited Nov. 25, 2020). The Board’s denial of the claim was, instead, based on
the finding of fact that the weight of the evidence showed that symptoms of tinnitus were not in
fact continuous since service. Id. The Board had specifically weighed the proffered excuses for the
absence of relevant complaints in service or for twenty-nine years after service, but it found such
assertions were outweighed by the other evidence, so they were not considered to be credible. Id.
86. 38 U.S.C. § 1112 (stating that a chronic disease becoming manifest to a degree of ten
percent or more within one year from service separation shall be considered to have been incurred
in or aggravated by such service, notwithstanding the lack of diagnosis or treatment during service);
38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b) (2018) (stating that service connection will be presumed where there are either
chronic symptoms shown in service or continuity of symptomatology since service for diseases
identified as “chronic” in 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a) (2018); with a chronic disease shown as such in
service, subsequent manifestations of the same chronic disease at any later date, however remote,
are service connected, unless clearly attributable to intercurrent causes; for the showing of chronic
disease in service, there is required a combination of manifestations sufficient to identify the disease
entity, and sufficient observation to establish chronicity at the time; if a condition noted during
service is not shown to be chronic, then generally, a showing of continuity of symptoms after
service is required for service connection).
87. Fountain, 27 Vet. App. at 274.
88. See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 370, 374 (2002) (“[R]inging in the ears is capable of
lay observation.”).
89. See FED. R. EVID. 803(7) (indicating that the absence of an entry in a record may be
evidence against the existence of a fact if such a fact would ordinarily be recorded); Kahana v.
Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428, 440 (2011) (stating that VA may use silence in the service treatment
records as evidence contradictory to a veteran’s assertions if the service treatment records appear
to be complete and the injury, disease, or symptoms involved would ordinarily have been recorded
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symptom might not be “severe” enough to be noticed), effectively creating new
evidence for the appellant as to why he had not reported any symptoms for
twenty-nine years after service. 90 This is contrary to the Board’s explicit finding
of fact that, after a weighing of the evidence, such post-service symptoms were
not in fact present—a finding that was owed clear error deference. 91
Another example of the Veterans Court’s misstatement of the Board’s actual
finding of fact is illustrated by the court’s factual assumption in Golden v.
Shulkin 92 that the Board relied on Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF)
psychological scale scores to deny a higher rating. 93 The facts found by the
Board in Golden are that, independent of any reliance on GAF scores, the Board
decision adjudicated the case on its merits and addressed relevant findings of
psychological symptoms and degrees of social and occupational impairment. 94
The Board decision did not use GAF scores to support its decision as to the
actual rating assigned or to deny a higher rating, but only referenced GAF scores
to see if a higher rating could be granted. 95 Consequently, the very broad
announcement by the court in Golden—that GAF scores are inherently
unreliable—did not apply to the case that announced it. 96
In the more recent precedent of Morgan v. Wilkie, 97 the Board had found
that “[n]either the facts of this case nor the Veteran’s allegations raise the issue
of extraschedular consideration.” 98 Notwithstanding this clear finding, the
Veterans Court found itself unable to say whether the Board had found that an
extraschedular issue had been raised, or not, and remanded the case back to the
Board for further explanation as to whether an extraschedular claim had been
raised. 99 By remanding the case, the Veterans Court avoided having to apply
had they occurred) (Lance, J., concurring); Buczynski v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 221, 224 (2011)
(stating that the absence of a notation in a record may be considered if it is first shown both that the
record is complete and also that the fact would have been recorded had it occurred).
90. Fountain, 27 Vet. App. at 273.
91. Id. at 274.
92. 29 Vet. App. 221, 224 (2018) (purporting to “hold” that VA should not use “GAF scores
to assign a psychiatric rating” in certain cases).
93. Id. at 223.
94. Id. at 222–23. Part of the Board’s finding was that “GAF scores assigned during the
relevant period do not provide a basis for assigning a higher rating,” that the “lowest score” showed
no greater impairment than the seventy percent rating assigned, and that other GAF scores not relied
upon showed even lesser impairment. Id. In other words, the Board considered the GAF scores only
for the purpose of seeing if they showed a higher rating were warranted; the Board decision in
Golden did not rely on a GAF score in making its decision regarding the level of compensation for
the service-connected psychological disorder it actually found. Id.; see Board docket No. 16-1208
at the Veterans Court website: https://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2019).
95. Golden, 29 Vet. App. at 226.
96. Id. at 225.
97. 31 Vet. App. 162, 162 (2019).
98. Id. at 165 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 164.
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clear error deference to the Board’s finding that an extraschedular claim had in
fact not been raised, avoided application of the rule of prejudicial error, 100 and
the Veterans Court’s own case law that applies the rule of prejudicial error to
this very type of claim, 101 and avoided the outcome of ending an extraschedular
appeal odyssey that the court itself had allowed to be raised where there was
never an actual claim or evidence of extraschedular impairment in the case. 102
Similar misstatements or mischaracterization of Board findings of fact
appear in nonprecedential memorandum decisions of the Veterans Court, which
are cited here to show their use by various judges in more fact-determinative
single judge cases where no novel legal question is presented. 103 In one such
case, the Board’s finding of fact—that the first diagnosis of schizophrenia
occurred a few years after service—was mischaracterized as a finding that the
veteran’s father died after service. 104 Another nonprecedential decision
misstated that there was “no explanation” to support an examiner’s opinion
before reporting four supporting explanations. 105 Another single judge decision
incorrectly declared that specific symptoms were not “complaints” from the
appellant as the Board had stated, when in fact they were. 106 Deference to agency
100. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (providing the Veterans Court shall “take due account of the rule
of prejudicial error.”).
101. See Fisher v. Principi, 4 Vet. App. 57, 60 (1993) (“[I]n the absence of exceptional or
unusual circumstances, the failure to deal with [a different type of extraschedular rating under 38
C.F.R. § 4.16(b) that has the same referral standard] would at the most be harmless error.”); Bagwell
v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 337, 339 (1996) (holding that no prejudice in the Board’s non-referral where
factors that are not capable of raising extraschedular referral were identified); Shipwash v. Brown,
8 Vet. App. 218, 227 (1995) (finding that there were no exceptional or unusual circumstances
shown in the case to even require the Board to discuss extraschedular referral); Thun v. Peake, 22
Vet. App. 111, 117 (2008) (holding that where the assertions are not capable of raising
extraschedular referral, there is no harm in the Board’s denial of referral).
102. See Parker, supra note 15, at 230 (explaining a further analysis of how the facts in Morgan
never identified actual extraschedular impairment, as well as recent Veterans Court trends creating
a dual track extraschedular rating system even by using schedular rating criteria to do so).
103. See id., supra note 15, at 205.
104. See McElroy v. Wilkie, No. 17-0921, 2018 BL 179893, at *1–2 (Vet. App. May 21, 2018).
105. See Gormlet v. O’Rourke, No. 17-0963, 2018 BL 257780, at *4–5 (Vet. App. July 18,
2018) (stating the examiner “offered no explanation to support his medical opinion” as to what
caused the veteran’s death, before reporting in the same and subsequent paragraph that the examiner
1) noted no significant treatment for asbestos since service, 2) that x-ray findings showed
complications from a non-service-related disease of AML and not the service-connected pleural
condition, 3) that a review of medical literature showed no relationship between asbestos exposure
and AML, and 4) identified an AML risk factor of smoking, where there was a 40-year history of
smoking in the case).
106. Compare McClaskey v. O’Rourke No. 16-1280, 2018 BL 233768, at *1–2, *4 (Vet. App.
June 29, 2018), with No. 08-17 677 (B.V.A. March 8, 2016) (https://www.va.gov/vetapp16/files2
/1609330.txt) showing that the appellant’s complaints of the following: pain (reported by appellant
at 1/07, 9/09, 10/13, and 7/15 VA examinations), less movement than normal (decreased motion
and stiffness reported at 1/07 & 9/09 VA exams), fatigability (weakness reported at 1/07 VA exam,

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

AS A MATTER OF FACT

307

expertise could have supplied the meaning of this term. 107 In one case, the
Veterans Court decision substituted its own fact-finding by converting a nonservice-related, post-service back injury (herniated nucleus pulposus with sciatic
nerve injury) into the already service-connected, back disability (strain and
arthritis with tenderness). 108 These individual judge decisions are virtually
unreviewable by the Federal Circuit Court precisely because they are fact
intensive and there is not a novel question of law at issue. 109
C. Dissolving Facts in Mixed Questions of Fact and Law
“Facts don’t cease to exist because they are ignored.”
– Aldous Huxley 110
Nearly thirty years of Veterans Court jurisprudence has occasionally drawn
the Federal Circuit Court to remind the Veterans Court to properly maintain fact
deference within the mixed law-fact question. 111 Once the Veterans Court enters
the law-fact arena, the tendency is to focus only on the legal question (to which
the court owes no deference) rather than the basic facts (to which the court still
owes clear error deference). 112 Applying only one standard of deference in a case
fatigue and weakness at 9/09 VA exam), interference with sitting, standing, weight bearing (flare
ups and inability to do anything until pain subsides, use of cane as assistive device, and can only
walk ¼ of a mile reported at 1/07 & 9/09 VA exams; pain aggravated by walking, relieved by
relieving weight bearing by leaning over something, reported at 10/13 VA exam; could not sit or
lift, and used wheelchair, cane, and walker, reported at 7/15 VA exam). The appellant submitted
lay statements corroborating his complaints of pain, with associated decreased function, need to
rest, and difficulty in sitting, standing, and walking No. 08-17 677 (BVA March 8, 2016)
(https://www.va.gov/vetapp16/files2/1609330.txt).
107. Agency expertise instructs that a “complaint” by a patient is not a formal legal
proclamation but is simply a symptom of which a person is aware, or which causes discomfort and
which is often the principal reason for seeking medical attention. See DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 399 (31st ed. 2007).
108. See Kennedy v. O’Rourke, No. 16-2780, 2018 BL 193446, at *2–3, *5 (Vet. App. May
31, 2018) (showing that in a case where the veteran was service connected for lumbar tenderness,
arthritis, and strain, the Court misstates that the “appellant appears to be service connected for the
post-service work injury” at the post office that caused a herniated disc with sciatica).
109. Id. at *1; Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Kyhn v. Shinseki, 716
F.3d 572, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
110. Stephanie Williams, I’m New Here, Week Twelve…, HISTORY’S NEWSSTAND BLOG (May
3, 2019, 1:31 PM), blog.rarenewspapers.com/?p=10351&print=1.
111. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“the ultimate conclusion [of
well-groundedness] is a question of law, but that conclusion rests on factual matters the
determination of which by the agency fact-finders is entitled on review to substantial deference.”);
Kyhn v. Shinseki, 716 F.3d 572, 577 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The Veterans Court’s application of the
presumption of regularity to this factual finding does not convert the underlying finding [that VA
had a regular practice of notifying of examinations] into a legal conclusion.”).
112. Bernard Schwartz, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 19 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 74 (1950).
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simplifies the appellate court’s tasks. Dissolving the fact-law distinction has the
added benefit of bringing about a desired outcome. 113 Similar treatment of
factual questions de novo is not unique to the Veterans Court. 114 For example,
parallel federal court deference failures have been identified in Federal District
Court reviews of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decisions of Social Security
Administration (SSA) appeals. 115
While the question of whether the Veterans Court has jurisdiction in a case
is ultimately a legal determination, the determination is based on specific facts
such as who the claimant is, whether filing deadlines were met, and whether
there was relevant evidence submitted (regardless of its strength). 116 In one
nonprecedential decision, the Veterans Court overlooked the underlying
documents and jurisdictional facts found in the Board decision (adjudication
document, appeal documents, and readjudication document), which led to the
court’s mistaken and unexplained conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking over
the issue. 117 Contrast the Veterans Court precedent in Criswell v. Nicholson, 118
which did apply clear error deference, upholding the Board’s finding that
medical records did not demonstrate an intent to file a claim for VA benefits. 119
A specific variety of this technique for dissolving facts within mixed
questions is when the Veterans Court treats legal-sounding findings of facts,
such as relevance, credibility, and weight of the evidence, as purely legal
questions to which no deference (de novo review) is owed. 120 Focusing the
The reviewing court itself has the final word upon whether the particular finding is one of
“law” or “fact”, and in deciding that question it, in effect, determines whether the review of
that finding is to be a broad or narrow one . . . As one observer has pointed out, “since all
rules of law are something more than abstract propositions of logic, and depend for their
meaning on their relevance to certain states of fact, it is inevitable that Courts should often
lay down as matters of law what are really in essence matters of fact.”
Id. (quoting C.K. ALLEN, LAW AND ORDERS 160 (1945)).
113. Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Nonjury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L.
REV. 1020, 1022 (1967) (focusing on single judge decisions in nonjury civil cases) (“if the court
feels that a trial judge’s determination should be reversed, it will classify it as a legal conclusion,
thereby making reversal easier.”).
114. See GELBACH & MARCUS, infra note 115, at 56.
115. See JONAH B. GELBACH & DAVID MARCUS, A STUDY OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 56 (July 28,
2016) (providing an excellent overview of SSA processes and appeals to and through the federal
courts by quoting SSA lawyers and personnel as to the effect that federal courts ignore the
“substantial evidence” standard of review when reviewing ALJ decisions in SSA appeals, and often
adjudicate factual questions).
116. See Robertson v. Shulkin, No. 15-3269, 2017 WL 1046284, at *2 (Vet. App. Mar 20,
2017).
117. See id.
118. Criswell v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 501, 504 (2006).
119. Id.
120. Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 258, 274 (2015).
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discussion on credibility-related legal questions (such as the legal standard to
weigh conflicting evidence and case law as to which evidence can even be
considered in the weighing of credibility, etc.) diverts from the fact that the
Board already weighed the evidence and found as a basic fact that the
claimant/affiant was not credible.
The Veterans Court in Fountain appears to have dissolved the Board’s
findings of absence of continuous symptoms, and lack of credibility, into its de
novo review of the entire case, both law and facts. 121 In Fountain, the Board
weighed the evidence and made a credibility determination, finding as a material
fact that the veteran had not experienced symptoms of tinnitus continuously
since service—a finding of fact that was owed clear error deference. 122 The
Fountain court announced the rule of law that a chronic disease legal
presumption applied to tinnitus—a rule of law that the Veterans Court decides
de novo—even though the facts in Fountain did not support this holding. 123
The Fountain court’s reasoning tacitly admits that its holding was not based
on the facts of the case (“there may be reasons unrelated to the merits of the
claim or unrelated to whether a claimant is experiencing symptoms”) 124 but was
being made regardless of the credibility of the evidence (“merits of the claim”)
against credibility, and was contrary to the evidence that showed an absence of
post-service symptoms for twenty-nine years (“unrelated to whether a claimant
is experiencing symptoms”). 125 By doing so, the Board’s fact finding on
credibility and continuous symptoms had been dissolved by Fountain’s
characterization of the entire case as one of legal analysis and holding. 126
Deference to Board fact finding does not necessarily mean that the claim
will be denied. One recent memorandum decision illustrates the proper clear
error deference to the Board’s findings of fact and weighing of evidence
pursuant to a disability rating, leaving the Board’s findings intact, then reversing

121. Id. at 259–60.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 264–65.
124. Id. at 274.
125. Fountain, 27 Vet. App. at 274.
126. Id. at 274–75. The holding unsupported by the found facts in Fountain rendered the
Board’s fact finding on credibility and continuous symptoms irrelevant to the holding in this case,
which strongly suggested the Board should make different findings of fact—a suggestion that the
Board followed to reverse the outcome of the case. Id. Upon remand, following the lead of the
Court’s sub silentio suggestion, the subsequent Board decision excused the twenty (plus)-year
absence of symptoms, finding the veteran to be credible in the retroactive reporting of tinnitus
symptoms, and finding as a fact that there were continuous post-service symptoms that met the
criteria for presumptive service connection. Id.
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the outcome of the case because the Board had committed legal error that
required a separate disability rating. 127
D. Fact Finding via the “Reasons and Bases” Requirement
“Facts are facts and will not disappear on account of your likes.”
– Jawaharlal Nehru 128
The Board must provide adequate reasons and bases to support its findings
of fact and conclusions of law. 129 When the Board’s reasons are incomplete or
inadequate, the Veterans Court may remedy the deficiency by vacating the
Board’s decision, then remand the case back for clearer reasons and bases. 130
The Veterans Court remands most of its cases back to the Board using the
reasons and bases requirement, 131 a practice that finds parallels in the federal
court review of ALJ decisions in SSA appeals. 132
The remand for clearer reasons should not be used to direct the Board to
insert preferred inferences from the evidence, as a way of reweighing the case,
or for a different case outcome. 133 Such court-ordered quasi-relitigation of the

127. See Ziminsky v. Wilkie, No. 17-4163, 2019 WL 82126, at *3 (Vet. App. Jan. 3, 2019)
(stating that the “[Veterans] Court will not disturb [the] favorable findings” of the Board that
provide the “factual predicat[ion] necessary” for a separate disability rating).
128. Jawaharlal Nehru Quotes, GOODREADS, INC., https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/3581
63-facts-are-facts-and-will-not-disappear-on-account-of (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
129. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (2019) (stating that a Board decision must include a written
statement of the Board’s findings and conclusions, and the reasons or bases for those findings and
conclusions, on all material issues of fact and law presented on the record); see also Caluza v.
Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995) (“[T]he Board’s statement of reasons or bases must account
for the evidence which it finds to be persuasive or unpersuasive, analyze the credibility and
probative value of all material evidence submitted by and on behalf of a claimant, and provide the
reasons for its rejection of any such evidence.”).
130. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2019) (stating that the Veterans Court “shall have power to . . .
reverse a decision of the Board or remand the matter, as appropriate.”).
131. Ridgway & Ames, supra note 13, at 316 (“[N]early half of all reasons for remand were in
situations in which the Board discussed the issue or evidence in dispute, but the [Veterans Court]
could not, or would not, conclude that the Board’s analysis was wrong.”).
132. GELBACH & MARCUS, infra note 115, at 44, 47 (reviewing federal court remand rates in
recent years of not less than 45%, coupled with a reversal rate of only 3%, with SSA plaintiffs
prevailing at more than double the rate of other administrative agency appeals, and noting some
have suggested that such a high remand rate is inconsistent with a standard of review that requires
deference to agency findings of fact).
133. Boelzner, supra note 23, at 681, 688–89.
But how can the Court consider the soundness of the Board’s reasoning in reaching those
factual conclusions without running afoul of the specific admonition in 38 U.S.C. §
7261(a)(4) that the reviewing court must accept the Board’s material findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous? If findings of fact are subject to review and rejection or revision
by the Court if inadequately reasoned, is the Court impermissibly substituting its judgment
for that of the Board? If the Board provides no statement of reasons and bases, it has violated
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facts of the case would be inconsistent with the foundational principle of res
judicata. 134
In Morgan v. Wilkie, the Veterans Court remanded the case for the Board to
provide further reasons and bases to support a finding of fact the Board clearly
had already made (that an extraschedular rating claim had not been raised by the
veteran or the evidence). 135 The Veterans Court used the remand-for-reasonsand-bases platform to direct the Board to a variety of other schedular rating
remedies 136 that were not even claimed, 137 and had been virtually abandoned
before the Veterans Court, as the focus of the arguments was on extra-schedular
referral rather than a schedular rating. 138
As this case did not factually support further extraschedular precedent in this
area of the law, which the Veterans Court panels have radically altered in recent
years, 139 precisely because an extraschedular claim was never raised, the
the statute and committed error warranting remand. But can the Court review the soundness
of the reasons and bases and still respect the Board’s material findings of fact?

Id.
134. Id.
135. 31 Vet. App. 162, 164 (2019); see discussion of Morgan, supra Section I.B, Misstating or
Mischaracterizing the Agency’s Findings of Fact.
136. Morgan, 31 Vet. App. at 164. The Veterans Court in Morgan, after entertaining an
extraschedular remedy for two years, refocuses on the rating schedule remedies, namely, secondary
service connection, rating by analogy, resolving reasonable doubt to grant a higher schedular rating,
special monthly compensation, and rating under more than one diagnostic code. Id. These rating
schedule remedies, when applied, moot the need for extraschedular remedies. Id. The Veterans
Court also lists individual unemployability as a rating schedule remedy, even though it is legally a
different type of extraschedular remedy. Id.; see also Parker, supra note 15 (showing additional
Rating Schedule remedies available to compensate disabilities).
137. Morgan, 31 Vet. App. at 164 (showing that as of March 24, 2015, claims for VA benefits,
which include claims for secondary service connection under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310, must be filed on
the standardized claim form prescribed by the VA Secretary); see also 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.150 (2014),
3.151 (2019); 79 Fed. Reg. 7660 (Sept. 25, 2014) (eliminating informal claims by requiring that,
effective March 24, 2015, VA claims be filed on standard forms).
138. Morgan, 31 Vet. App. at 164. It is understandable that the Veterans Court in Morgan
would want the Board to remedy the conundrum that it had created over the last few years by
suggesting extraschedular ratings that might apply to any stray symptoms, even those that are
explicitly in the rating schedule, so would now strongly suggest that the VA grant service
connection for unclaimed secondary service connection symptoms or somehow grant compensation
for such symptoms so as to moot the extraschedular question it had entertained on appeal for two
years, fully and extensively briefed with supplementary briefings, and even entertained oral
argument presented to an en banc panel—notwithstanding the extraschedular rating issue had never
been raised or found to be raised before VA, and had been found by the Board not to have been
raised. Id. The only way to avoid ruling on the fully briefed extraschedular question before it, which
with application of clear error deference (or any degree of deference) would have ended the
veteran’s extraschedular quest, was to find a reasons and bases deficiency in order to punt the case
back to the Board to provide a remedy under the VA Rating Schedule. Id.
139. See Parker, supra, note 15 (analyzing recent trends in Veterans Court jurisprudence of
extraschedular rating claims from 2016 to the present).
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Veterans Court in Morgan remanded the case ostensibly for further explanation,
and by doing so avoided rendering a substantive decision. 140
This redirection by the Veterans Court to schedular rating remedies in
Morgan strongly suggests that the Board, in order to follow the Veterans Court’s
suggestions to find a schedular remedy, will have to violate its own jurisdictional
limitations by adjudicating secondary service connection claims that were never
raised. 141 Undoubtedly, the Board as fact finder will comply with the court’s
very strong suggestion to change the facts in this case, in order to grant
secondary service connection for disabilities that are not even diagnosed and
have not been claimed and are shown by evidence to be related to the serviceconnected hearing loss disability. 142 This will likely result in a changed outcome
based on differently found facts that the court could not directly make.
The reasons and bases requirement on Board decisions can be interpreted in
a way to make the finding of a fact by the Board so onerous that the fact can
only be found in one direction. 143 Indicia of nondeference to Board fact finding
is when the Veterans Court finds itself deep in the weeds of the Board’s factual
findings—reporting extensive factual backgrounds and openly questioning
inferences from sub-sections of that evidence. In such cases, a call for clearer
explanation of the Board’s reasoning replaces the Veterans Court’s clear error
burden of sustaining a finding of fact where there is a “plausible basis in the
record” for the fact. 144
To illustrate an overly burdensome reasons and bases requirement, the
Veterans Court, in one nonprecedential decision where the Board had found that
a head laceration injury in service was not a stressor to cause posttraumatic stress
disorder, upon review, deflected the “clear error” burden of the Veterans Court
140. Morgan, 31 Vet. App. at 167. The Veterans Court instead chose a different case upon
which to land its desired extraschedular precedent by forming a new en banc panel in a case where
extraschedular rating was raised and substantively adjudicated. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. James D. Ridgway, VETERANS LAW: CASES AND THEORY 705 (2015).
The early case law of the [Veterans Court] turned the reasons or bases standard into a very
demanding requirement . . . By declaring that Board decisions lacked sufficient reasons or
bases to allow for review, the CAVC was able to pressure the Board into providing an
analysis so detailed that the decision could be understood by someone with no prior
familiarity with the process. The practical effect has been to shift the burden to the Board
to prove that its decisions are correct, regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to
support them.
Id.
144. See Reonal v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 458, 460 (1993) (“[T]he [Veterans] Court cannot reject
as clearly erroneous the Board’s finding of fact that [a doctor] based his opinion solely on
appellant’s account of his medical history [where the Board’s determination has a plausible basis
in the record]”); Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990) (showing that the Veterans Court
cannot reject a Board’s finding of fact as clearly erroneous when there is a “plausible basis in the
record.”).
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into a burden of clearer decision by the Board, 145 wading deep into the facts by
offering excuses for the appellant’s mendacity that were contrary to the Board’s
credibility finding.
The Veterans Court may question the Board’s inferences drawn from the
evidence to such an extent the series of qualms with the inferences serve as the
Veterans Court’s tacit rejection of the inferences that the Board drew. 146 In such
cases when the Veterans Court’s questions are read as strong suggestions to the
Board to draw different inferences that affect the weight of the evidence, the
Veterans Court’s wishes become the Board’s commands. 147
The remaining available possible inferences that the Board may draw dictate
finding different facts when the case is readjudicated during remand from the
Veterans Court. 148 For an example, one nonprecedential Veterans Court decision
imputes credibility to a lay statement that the Board had specifically weighed
against other evidence and found not to be credible. 149

145. See Kendrick v. Shinseki, No. 12-3520, 2014 WL 2054280, at *3–4, 5–6 (Vet. App. May
20, 2014) (stating that the Board “did not then clearly decide whether the appellant’s confirmed inservice injury can be classified as a verified PTSD stressor” before suggesting there were other
“implications of that event”). In this case, the Veterans Court somewhat quizzically found the
Board’s credibility finding not to be clearly erroneous, but itself offered various excuses for the
appellant’s mendacity regarding when symptoms of schizophrenia began (doing so in a rhetorical
flourish suggestive of doubt rather than clear error), and reweighed a medical examiner’s opinion
by suggesting how the examiner was supposed to have relied on the appellant’s inconsistent
histories. Id.
146. Koch, supra note 25, at 525 (“[S]pecific facts [(adjudicative facts)] can be proven in the
traditional ways. For this reason, [the Veterans] Courts might review these facts very closely.”).
147. See, e.g., Howell v. Wilkie, No. 17-1458, 2018 WL 2074128, at *1 (Vet. App. May 4,
2018), wherein the Veterans Court remanded under the reasons and bases requirement where it had
simply disagreed with the Board’s explicit credibility findings (the “Board has considered the
Veteran’s lay statements along with the medical evidence of record”; “the Board does not find the
Veteran’s statements as to his alleged severity of symptoms to be credible”), and does so by
selecting one examination report to dissect in detail while ignoring three other examination reports
and other medical and lay evidence that was reported and relied on by the Board. See infra Section
I.F. This memorandum decision reframes how the Board should weigh credibility, shifting away
from the Court’s clear error standard regarding review of the Board’s credibility finding to a clearer
reasons and bases requirement for the Board.
148. McElroy v. Wilkie, No. 17-0921, 2018 WL 2293292, at *2 (Vet. App. May 4, 2018).
149. Id. In McElroy, the Veterans Court reasserts the value of a lay statement that the Board
had specifically weighed and found not to be credible. Id. It is unclear what the Veterans Court was
trying to accomplish by this in-the-weeds reweighing of the evidence except for a general
relitigation of the case on remand, as the fact suggested by the Veterans Court to be favorable to
the case (that the veteran’s father was murdered before service and symptoms of schizophrenia
began prior to service) weighs against the veteran’s claim by tending to show a pre-service injury
and/or disease for which service connection cannot be granted as a matter of law. See id.
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This technique of relitigating inferences usually involves an extensive
factual reporting by the Veterans Court, 150 upon which it relies to review and
analyze the case, 151 with a detailed analysis of inferences drawn from particular
evidence. 152 By suggesting alternative implications of evidence and even
subparts of evidence (implicitly rejecting the implications the Board chose),153
the Board is steered to different findings and case outcome. 154 This type of fact
relitigation by the Veterans Court was supposed to have been precluded by the
clear error standard of review of Board decisions that was chosen by Congress
in the legislation establishing the Veterans Court. 155
150. See Jackson v. O’Rourke, No. 17-1655, 2018 WL 3700081, at *1–2, 4–5 (Vet. App. July
30, 2018) (showing an example of a nonprecedential Veterans Court decision that extensively
reports the facts, rejects the Board’s finding that certain medical opinions outweighed others, rejects
the Board’s finding that its prior orders had been complied with, suggests the fact of in-service
injury where the Board had found none, and suggests continuous symptoms after service where the
Board had already found that symptoms began years after service).
151. See Hensley v. West, 212 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (showing an example of how
the Veterans Court at times engages in fact finding by using in-depth factual reporting and analysis)
(“[T]he [Veterans Court] took it upon itself to review ‘de novo’ the [Board]’s determination of well
groundedness. . . . It began by dissecting the factual record in minute detail.”).
152. See Moody v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 329, 343–44 (2018) (Toth, J., dissenting) (describing
the majority opinion as having conducted “its own assessment of the record evidence” and
cautioning against a “third-act reevaluation of the evidence”); see also Veterans Court
nonprecedential memorandum decision 17-1823 for an example of a dissection of any distinction
between terms (“association” versus “aggravation” and “contribution” versus “causation”), with
the Court inconsistently stating that an examiner did not give an aggravation opinion before finding
that there was a discussion of aggravation that had an “incomplete rationale,” and substituting a de
novo rejection of the examiner’s three-part rationale for the opinion (1. association is not causation,
2. the veteran did not have the type of sleep apnea that could be associated with PTSD, and 3. there
were two other more likely causes of the disorder that the veteran had).
153. See Castillo v. Snyder, No. 15-4150, 2017 WL 507542, at *2 (Vet. App. Feb. 8, 2017)
(showing an example of a reweighing of an examiner’s opinion by the Veterans Court). The
Veterans Court first recharacterized the Board’s reference to a study showing “limited or suggestive
evidence of [an] association” (which, read in the study’s own context means that the VA examiner
“has determined that the evidence overall does not establish a positive association between
herbicide exposure and hypertension”), as a Board finding “that there was evidence indicating an
association,” then finding a supposed inconsistency between the Board’s alleged finding and a VA
examiner’s opinion that there was “no known association between herbicides and hypertension in
later years,” and doing so by removing the VA examiner’s qualifier of “in later years,” to then
ignore the Board’s finding of fact that the examiner’s opinion was adequate. Id. The Court’s remand
remedy was for the Board to ask the examiner to do what he had just done — consider
limited/suggestive studies when formulating the opinion. Id.
154. See id. at *3.
155. Proposed Veterans Administration Adjudication Procedure and Judicial Review Act and
Veterans Judicial Review Act: Hearing on S. 11 and H. 2292 Before the S Comm. on Veterans’
Affairs, 100th Cong. 335 (1988) (statement of Hon. Morris S. Arnold, Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. W.D.
Ark.) (“The [Veterans Courts] are not well equipped to determine such factual issues as whether or
not an injury is service-connected or to determine other medical or technical questions, which are
of a type the Veterans Administration confronts all of the time uniformly”); see, e.g., id. at 43
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Holding Does Not Apply to the Facts Error
“If you get all the facts, your judgment can be right; if you don’t get all
the facts, it can’t be right.”
– Bernard M. Baruch 156

When the Veterans Court finds it does not have a case with the factual
foundations upon which to make the legal precedent, 157 it must either abandon
the attempt to make the rule of law and wait for another case, 158 or force the
matter-of-law ruling onto the case at hand, reasoning that, regardless of the
specific facts of this case, the rule of law ought to be made applicable to similar
future cases. 159 An overly broad rule that is not applicable to the case at hand is
more in the nature of a legislative or policy statement, which are enacted or
created by other branches of government, than a legal interpretation to be issued
from the courts.
(statement of Hon. Stephen G. Breyer, Judge, U.S. Ct. of App. for the First Cir.) (“I believe that
reviewing Agency fact finding is something I don’t do very well.”); see also Gilbert v. Derwinski,
1 Vet. App. 49, 52 (1990), cited in Boelzner, supra note 23, at 685 n.24.
156. BURTON EGBERT STEVENSON, THE HOME BOOK OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 148 (1986
ed. 1967) (quoting ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 21, 1965, at 5A).
157. A purported legal “holding” announced in a case without the prerequisite facts to make
that holding, in addition to being dicta, commits the logical fallacy of Accident, which consists in
applying a general rule to a particular case whose “accidental” circumstances render the rule
inapplicable. IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 160 (11th ed. 2002); see Saunders, supra
note 6, at 367.
158. The Veterans Court in Spellers v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 211 (2018), showed restraint from
offering dicta, leaving “for another day” the unanswered legal question (of the possibility of
extraschedular referral based on severity when a disability reaches the maximum schedular rating)
that the Veterans Court held was not raised by the facts of the case.
159. See Doucette v. Shulkin, 28 Vet. App. 366 (2017) (showing an example of Veterans Court
matter-of-law “holdings” announced in dicta by holding that the VA disability rating schedule was
adequate to rate all the hearing loss symptoms that case and later suggesting a list of unrelated
symptoms that might be hearing loss symptoms in future cases). In a subsequent case of King v.
Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 174 (2017), the Veterans Court shows sensitivity to having its dicta in
Doucette labeled as such and attempts to retroactively “affirmatively hold now that it was not”
dicta. In King, the Veterans Court actually found no uncompensated symptoms under the facts of
the case, then offered a pure hypothetical as to how uncompensated symptoms in future cases
should be compensated, before self-declaring the hypothetical to be a matter-of-law holding
applicable to all cases. See King v. Shulkin, No. 16-2959, 2018 WL 1212422, at *1 (Vet. App. Mar.
8, 2018) (“[M]uch of our extraschedular jurisprudence has developed around advisory comments
that had no bearing on the resolution or facts of any case” (citing to Padgett v. Nicholson, 473 F.3d
1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the Veterans Court “does not decide hypothetical
claims.”))); Petermann v. Wilkie, 30 Vet. App. 150, 157 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Toth, J., dissenting)
(“The hypothetical discussion in King . . . remains dicta”); see also Petermann, 30 Vet. App. 150,
154–55 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (stating that the majority agreed that the hypothetical in King was dicta
in the strict sense because “it did not describe the precise facts in King,” but then found the question
of dicta to be academic because the fact pattern in Petermann “present[ed] that exact situation” as
contemplated by the King hypothetical).
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Such matter of law holdings in cases unsupported by the factual premises
create quasi-dicta that confuses the parties and the Board, so render unclear the
stare decisis effects of the court’s broad dicta announced as rules of law. The
Veterans Court creates a dilemma for those relying on its precedents—either 1)
treat the dicta as precedent and apply it to all future cases (even though the
overbroad holding may conflict with other law and precedent and raises
questions about its application to other contexts) or 2) ignore the court’s own
overbroad matter of law declaration (which is not a practical option at all, as the
same court who thought its dicta was a matter of law holding will surely use its
full legal authority to enforce its “holding” in all future cases). This is a loselose situation for the Veterans Court and any VA adjudicator honestly trying to
decipher the court’s dicta and apply it to future cases that have different facts.
Some Veterans Court decisions that illustrate this logic error include the
precedent of Fountain, wherein the court’s rule of law holding—that chronic
disease presumptive provisions are applicable to tinnitus—was not required or
supported by the facts in Fountain. 160 The credible facts as found by the Board
in Fountain showed no “continuous symptoms” for twenty-nine years after
service, and the chronic disease legal presumption had effectively already been
applied to the case by the fact that the Board had made findings regarding
chronic symptoms in service and continuous symptoms since service—findings
that would not be required if chronic disease presumptions did not apply. 161
This error of a holding unsupported by the facts is also illustrated by the
purported precedent of Golden. 162 In that precedent, the Veterans Court’s rule
of law that the “VA should not use GAF scores to assign a rating” was rendered
inapplicable to the case before it by the fact that the Board had not in fact relied
upon GAF scores when assigning the disability rating. 163 Such overly broad rule
made irrespective of the facts of a case more resembles VA policymaking,
rulemaking, or legislation than a legal holding by the court.

160. Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App.. 258, 266, 272 (2015).
161. Id. at 272; see discussion of Fountain, supra Section I.B, Misstating or Mischaracterizing
the Agency’s Findings of Fact (referencing the facts found by the Board).
162. Golden v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 221, 226 (2018).
163. Id.; For a more extensive discussion of the Board’s findings of fact in the Golden case, see
supra Section I.B, Misstating or Mischaracterizing the Agency’s Findings of Fact.
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Out of Context Error: Fallacy of Accent
“The fewer the facts, the stronger the opinion.”
– Arnold H. Glasow 164

Generally, VA fact-finding is based on a totality of the evidence
approach. 165 The Board is charged with considering all evidence that is in the
record, including lay evidence as well as medical evidence. 166 The evidence is
later sorted based on relevance, credibility, then weight, but is never
categorically excluded. 167 Lifting one fact out of context, while excluding the
mention of other facts, would clearly be a lower-body adjudicative error, as well
as logical error of fallacy of accent 168 if engaged in by the Veterans Court.
One example of fallacy of accent occurred in the Veterans Court precedent
of Horn v. Shinseki, wherein the Board had made a litany of factual findings to
support the finding that the Legg-Perthes disease the veteran had before service
clearly and unmistakably did not worsen in severity during service. 169 The
evidence relied on by the Board included that there was no hip injury during
service, the brief period of service was less than two months, the veteran
reported a pre-service history of left hip pain from Legg-Perthes disease since
age six, a service doctor who was treating the veteran medically opined that the
preexisting Legg-Perthes disease was not worsened by service, x-rays taken in
164. Arnold H. Glasglow Quotes, GOODREADS, INC., https://www.goodreads.com/author
/quotes/1965567.Arnold_H_Glasow (last visited Oct. 23, 2020).
165. R. Chuck Mason, Overview of the Appeal Process for Veterans’ Claims, CONG. RES.
SERV. REP. 7–5700 (Sept. 19, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42609.pdf.
166. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2018) (“Decisions of the Board shall be based on the entire record
in the proceeding and upon consideration of all evidence and material of record”); 38 U.S.C. §
5107(b) (“Secretary shall consider all information and lay and medical evidence of record in a
case”); 38 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (stating that Secretary should provide regulatory provisions as required
by due consideration of “all pertinent medical and lay evidence”).
167. See Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Davidson v. Shinseki,
581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
168. COPI, supra note 157, at 165 (“When a premiss relies for its apparent meaning on one
possible emphasis, but a conclusion is drawn from it that relies on the meaning of the same words
accented differently, the fallacy of accent is committed.”). The way in which the meaning shifts in
the fallacy of accent depends upon what parts of it may be emphasized or accented when the passage
quoted is torn from its context. Id.
169. Horn v. Shinseki, 25 Vet. App. 231, 237, 245 (Vet. App. 2012). Under 38 U.S.C. § 1111
and 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b), a veteran will be considered to have been in sound condition when
examined, accepted, and enrolled for service, except as to defects, infirmities, or disorders noted at
entrance into service, or where clear and unmistakable evidence demonstrates that an injury or
disease existed prior to and was not aggravated by service. To be considered “noted,” the condition
must be recorded in an examination report. 38 C.F.R. § 3.304(b) (2019). When a defect, infirmity,
and/or disorder is not noted upon examination, to rebut the presumption of soundness, VA must
show by clear and unmistakable evidence both that the disease or injury existed prior to service and
that the disease or injury was not aggravated by service. See Wagner v. Principi, 370 F.3d 1089,
1092 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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service showed already severe deformity consistent with “old” Legg-Perthes
disease, a service medical board (which included a physician) concluded there
was no worsening during service, the medical board’s opinion was based on
careful review of clinical records, health records, and medical examination
reports, the actual symptoms at service separation were identical to those prior
to service, and that years after service x-ray findings and symptoms were also
identical to the pre-service symptoms. 170
Out of all these facts found by the Board relying on both lay and medical
evidence, the Veterans Court selected a single fact based on one piece of medical
evidence to frame the legal question as “whether a medical examination board
(MEB) report containing only an unexplained 171 ‘X’ in a box on a form can
constitute clear and unmistakable evidence of lack of aggravation.” 172 This
single fact was presented by the Veterans Court as the only fact in the case for
which its rule of law depended. 173 The Horn majority omitted a host of
contextual facts, documentary evidence, and other lay and medical evidence 174
relevant to the “legal” question it chose as the issue. Any question of what the
“X” on one item of evidence meant could have been easily resolved by deference
to agency expertise 175 acquired from routinely interpreting such medical board
reports.
In its precedent in Fountain, the Board had weighed the evidence and found
as a fact that symptoms of tinnitus had not been continuous since service,
including that the appellant was not credible in recent reports that such
170. Horn, 25 Vet. App. at 237–38.
171. Labeling the “X” as “unexplained” is also an example of a misstatement or
mischaracterization of the Board decision’s findings as the Board decision had specifically found
as facts that an October 1970 medical board included a physician, that the medical board carefully
reviewed clinical records, health records, and medical examination reports, and that the medical
board report included a medical opinion by a physician that the preexisting Legg-Perthes disease
was not aggravated during service. This factual answer is contrary to the “holding” to which the
court arrived, namely, that the medical board’s “X” designation lacks any factual or evidentiary
value to prove a disability did not get worse during service.
172. Horn, 25 Vet. App. at 233.
173. Even though the fact lifted from its context is a true fact, either standing alone without
context or providing a new context could be misleading. See COPI, supra note 157, at 167 (“Even
the literal truth can . . . deceive [when placed in a misleading context].”).
174. See Horn, 25 Vet. App. at 245–46 (Lance, J., dissenting) (pointing out “that the majority
understates the current evidence . . . in this case there are numerous pieces of evidence against the
appellant’s claim . . . [,and] there is other evidence in the record against the claim that the majority
fails to acknowledge.”).
175. Agency expertise includes the knowledge that medical boards include at least one
physician, and that the “X” placed in a specific box is a medical opinion of non-aggravation by
service. See id. (Lance, J., dissenting) (pointing out that even the significance of the “X” was
inaccurately stated by the majority: “the mark on the MEB report is far from the only evidence
against this claim,” and that, as “to the MEB report itself, the mark . . . is not the only relevant
portion . . . [in which] three doctors were unanimous in” the non-aggravation opinion).
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symptoms had been continuous, first mentioning such symptoms twenty-nine
years after service. The Veterans Court again engaged in out-of-context logical
error by mischaracterizing that the Board only relied on two reasons for its
credibility finding—absence of complaints of tinnitus symptoms during service
and for many years after service, 176 and the failure to file a claim for VA benefits
for years after service. 177
The Fountain court omitted several of the Board’s additional material
findings of fact: the veteran’s own contemporaneous lay history at service
separation denying symptoms, the absence of medical findings, the affirmative
act of filing four other VA compensation claims for other disorders while not
claiming tinnitus, the significant post-service noise exposure doing road work
for twenty-six years, the veteran’s affirmative denial of tinnitus after service at
an examination, a medical opinion that it was unlikely tinnitus was related to
service, and multiple medical histories reported by the veteran that also did not
mention tinnitus symptoms. 178
These medical histories, which solicited reporting of known past and present
symptoms, in the context of naming other disorders but omitting any mention of
tinnitus, is a very different fact from just an “absence of complaints” in a contextfree vacuum. 179 By its selective framing of evidence and findings, the Veterans
Court showed little deference to the extensive facts found, and little deference
to the Board’s finding of fact that the recent reports of continuous post-service
symptoms were outweighed by other evidence so were not credible. 180
This out-of-context fallacy also makes its appearance in routine
memorandum decisions of the Veterans Court. In one decision, the Veterans
Court misleadingly suggested the Board decision relied only on one examination
report in making a credibility finding, omitting reference to the Board’s reliance
on three other examination reports, medical treatment records, and the veteran’s
own lay histories presented at the examinations.181 Another Veterans Court
nonprecedential decision purported to find a Board deficiency in addressing an
appellant’s testimony but arrived at this conclusion by omitting several
outcome-determinative Board findings of fact, including decades of smoking
after service and a VA examiner’s opinion that smoking caused the lung
cancer. 182
176. Fountain v. McDonald, 27 Vet. App. 258, 262 (2015).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 73–74, 260–61.
179. Id. at 262.
180. Id. at 272.
181. See Howell v. Wilkie, No. 17-1458, 2018 WL 2074128, at *1 (Vet. App. May 4, 2018).
182. See Bayes v. Shulkin, No. 16-1985, 2017 WL 3751677, at *2 (Vet. App. Aug. 31, 2017)
(omitting the following Board findings of fact: that the veteran smoked for decades, the medical
opinion and Board finding of fact that smoking was the cause of the lung cancer, the finding of fact
of no nexus of lung cancer to agent orange or toxins, that the veteran was not at the Thailand base
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When the Veterans Court vacates the Board’s findings in such cases by
finding deficiency with one or two findings lifted out of the factual context of
the case, effectively removing the fact as found from the subsequent range of
findings the Board may make, the court’s quasi-relitigation of the fact unsettles
the facts found by the Board. When the Veterans Court does this in a precedent,
it props the precedent on a shaky foundation.
G. Ad Hominem Fallacy (Attack on the Agency)
“When you have no basis for an argument, abuse the plaintiff.”
— Cicero 183
Depicting the VA as an entity that exists for the purpose of denying veterans
their well-deserved benefits, and who only reluctantly and by great force of law
enforced by an appellate court, 184 pays such benefits, is another type of ad
hominem logical fallacy. 185 This implication that the VA withholds or delays
benefits usually travels together with an emotional appeal for benefits that,
wishing for a different outcome, begs the very case question of whether the facts
and law actually support the grant of benefits. 186
during the time when it was sprayed with herbicides, and that service duties did not take the veteran
to the perimeter of the military base).
183. DAVID S. SHRAGER & ELIZABETH FROST, THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 76 (1986).
184. For an example of how a Veterans Court single judge decision anachronistically and
selectively lifted a mere four words from the 1886 U.S. Supreme Court case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 366 (1886), to attribute bad motives to the Board, see Pratt v. Wilkie, No. 19-0919,
2020 WL 2463070, at *5 (Vet. App. May 13, 2020) (stating that the requirement for a Board
“statement of reasons or bases serves not only to help a claimant understand what has been decided,
but also to ensure that VA decisionmakers do not exercise ‘naked and arbitrary power’ in deciding
entitlement to disability benefits”) (emphasis added). Yick Wo involved a local city ordinance that
discriminated against a Chinese non-citizen, and which involved questions from the U.S.
Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, as well as a mind-boggling host of
further legal distinctions that include there was no VA until 1930 and no Board until 1936. The
‘clear’ implication that the Board in 2020, despite the legal obligations to follow laws, regulations,
and thirty years of Veterans Court precedent, is inclined to exercise “naked and arbitrary power” to
deny claims is nothing short of an explicit, unwarranted, and Veterans Court-dishonoring ad
hominem attack.
185. See Saunders, supra note 6, at 345 (explaining more completely this type of logical
fallacy).
186. See, e.g., one citation to Hayburn’s Case, routinely inserted in Veterans Court decisions:
As “many unfortunate and meritorious [veterans], whom [C]ongress have justly thought
proper objects of immediate relief, may suffer great distress, even by a short delay, and may
be utterly ruined by a long one,” 2 U.S. 408, 414 (1792); see 38 U.S.C. § 7112.
This unfortunate citation to Hayburn’s Case for the proposition that a delay in getting benefits to
veterans would leave veterans in financial ruin gives the reader of the Veterans Court decision the
mistaken impression that VA is trying to delay payment of veterans’ claims. An actual reading of
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. at 413, shows that it was the Article III Courts who were refusing to pay
pensions to veterans (“this Circuit court cannot be justified in the execution of that part of the act,
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As applied to VA fact-finding, this logical fallacy presupposes that, because
VA adjudications are performed for the purpose of denying benefits, VA
adjudicative facts found do not deserve much deference, if any deference at
all. 187 For a more explicit example of an ad hominem attack on VA and Board
decisions, a recent dissent in a Veterans Court decision characterized a Board
finding that the appellant could have filed for VA benefits as “a basic Board
error and thoughtless” and “nothing more than a heartless attempt to dehumanize
a veteran.” 188 Participation in such a logical fallacy is, of course, beneath the
dignity of any appellate court, including the Veterans Court, 189 just as it is
incompatible with clear error deference owed to the Board’s fact-finding.
CONCLUSION
“One precedent creates another and they soon accumulate and
constitute law. What yesterday was a fact, today is doctrine.”
– Junius 190
The Veterans Court’s appellate role includes providing oversight based on
the rule of law, sound logic, evidentiary principles designed to lend legal
guidance for future cases, and error correction in Board decisions. 191 These
aspirations are compromised when the court is lured to direct the outcome in the
which requires it to examine and report an opinion on the unfortunate cases of officers and soldiers
disabled in the service of the United States.”). It was the Article II Executive Branch’s U.S.
Attorney General who interposed on behalf of the veteran who had claimed for pension because
the Court had refused to hear the veteran’s case and provide the relief the veteran sought. Of course,
citation to Hayburn’s Case in a veterans’ law context is highly questionable. First, there are now
distinguishing features of an established VA, decades of statutory and regulatory benefits
authorizations, administrative law due process and property “entitlement” protections, all
reinforced by a body of case law by the Veterans Court. Second, the real legal significance of
Hayburn’s Case was the separation of powers of the three branches of the federal government under
the U.S. Constitution, not which branch was trying to force payment of ad hoc veterans benefits
and which branch was refusing to pay the benefits. For a review of the extensive layers of due
process in veterans’ benefits law, see Michael P. Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran:
What the Constitution Can Tell Us About the Veterans’ Benefits System, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 501,
502 (2011).
187. Saunders, supra note 6, at 345.
188. Taylor v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 147, 158 (2019) (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (providing another example of ad hominem attack on VA by anachronistically attributing
“bad acts” of the military service department nerve agent experimentation decades earlier to the
current VA adjudication); id. at 162 (“VA attempts to separate itself from the bad acts of the
Department of Defense. Yet, VA serves as part of one Government.”).
189. This both ironic and misleading Hayburn’s Case quotation, which heretofore had routinely
found its way to single judge memorandum decisions, recently was inserted into Veterans Court
precedents. See, e.g., Golden v. Shulkin, 29 Vet. App. 221, 226 (2018); Petermann v. Wilkie, 30
Vet. App. 150, 156 (Vet. App. 2018).
190. 1 JUNIUS, THE LETTERS OF JUNIUS 3 (1772).
191. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a).
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case immediately before it, 192 including by creative reinterpretations of facts
found in a case.
Fact-finding consumes the Veterans Court’s resources relitigating facts
already found. Non-deferential treatment of the Board’s findings functions as a
quasi-relitigation of the facts in a case, undermining any res judicata effect of
the facts found by the Board. In the short term, the Veterans Court has averted
such drain of resources by extensive use of joint motions for remand, which are
agreements by VA and the appellant that are filed with the court Clerk to remand
the case. 193 As these joint motions for remand are not substantively reviewed by
a judge of the court, the veteran-appellant never benefits from a substantive
review of his or her case because a Veterans Court judge never saw the case that
bears the imprimatur of court order. 194
Forcing the Board to relitigate the facts of a case on remand from the court,
whether by a joint motion or single judge decision, creates a delay of other cases
before VA and the court, and suggests to an appellant in most cases that there is
more merit to a case than is actually present. In reality, only a small percentage
of those cases remanded by the court materialize in monetary benefits to the
appellant. 195
In theory, the facts of the case are to drive the case to its inevitable legal
conclusion, creating a stare decisis effect that leads to the same legal conclusion
in subsequent factually similar cases, creating consistent Veterans Court rulings.
Matter of law holdings by the Veterans Court rendered in cases unsupported by
the factual premises necessary to that holding create quasi-dicta that render
unclear any stare decisis effects of the Veterans Court’s holding. Such an overly
broad rule resembles legislation or policy making that belongs to the other
branches of government. Such an over-broad rule made without factual
predicates will lead to overbroad and questionable applications to cases with
different facts. The court’s broad rules have to be implemented by VA
adjudicators who have been handed such abstract rules without a guiding
context.
192. Koch, supra note 25, at 527 (arguing that, if courts were to review the findings of
administrative tribunals “with any depth, they would be paralyzed and unable to perform more
important functions. . . . If we mire the courts in the mass of specific factual decisions, even
controversial ones, made by the bureaucracy, we will prevent the courts from performing much
more important functions to which they can make a greater contribution. Thus, the courts may have
the capacity to review findings of specific fact very closely but should not.”).
193. Hillary Bunker et al., Reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act to Maximize Veterans’
Receipt of Benefits and Increase Efficiency of the Claims Process, 4 VETERANS L. REV., 206, 214
(2012).
194. Id. at 208.
195. Ridgway & Ames, supra note 13, at 305 (arguing that “years of data on decisions by both
the CAVC and the Board indicate that these remands do not translate into either more favorable
outcomes for the individual veterans or useful systemic changes” and has not changed the rate at
which the Board grants claims).
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The technique of lifting one fact out of its larger factual context calls into
question any precedential value of the court’s “holding,” leaving confusion in
its wake as to whether the holding only applies when the narrowly emphasized
fact (for example, an “X” on a medical board report) is repeated in a future
case. 196 If a rule of law can be announced in any case without regard to the facts
of that case, then every statement penned by the Veterans Court in panel
decisions for the last thirty years is potentially a precedent.
This uncertainty as to precedential value risks creating precedent fatigue by
VA adjudicators left to search and divine actual holdings among dicta. 197
Ethereal declarations in dicta, whether they claim to be precedent or not,
necessarily dilute the value of the Veterans Court’s actual precedents, which can
only succeed with the force of law intended if they are clear, logical, and make
sense on a recognizable set of similar facts.
The Veterans Court diminishes its reputation in the veterans’ law
community as the law guide when it steps down to rearrange facts or downplay
the significance of the facts already found in a case. When the court injects its
outcome preferences by second-guessing inferences drawn from the evidence
and reweighing evidence, or begs the question as to whether the facts support
the payment of benefits in a given case, it takes on the narrow, inappropriate role
of a party to the litigation. The Veterans Court should leave the partisan role to
appellate representatives, who, in contrast, have no broad duty to ensure a fair
system, but a duty only to try to change the case outcome, and who are paid even
if the result is a remand from the court that never results in any compensation to
the veteran-appellant. Trading its reputation as a fair arbiter of the legal
questions brought before it is a dear price for the Veterans Court to pay for shortterm change of specific case outcomes.
As any ad hominem rhetoric from any corners of the Veterans Court only
feeds the facts-be-damned blogosphere lore that the VA disability compensation
system is adversarial and imbalanced against veterans, this causes veterans to be
even more dissatisfied with the VA disability compensation system. For all the
due process layers that have created a multi-year evolution VA claims process,
the VA disability compensation system is still very adept at maximizing VA
compensation benefits. When the frustrations with the Congressional add-on
designs of the VA disability system are personalized into motives attributable to
VA adjudicators, this lose-lose rhetoric unnecessarily diminishes veterans’
confidence in the VA disability compensation system.
Who can remedy the Veterans Court’s fact-finding deference practices but
the Veterans Court itself? While the Federal Circuit Court in recent years has
196. Horn, 25 Vet. App. at 233.
197. See the “Court” perspective of the Board in Jeffrey Parker, Two Perspectives on Legal
Authority Within the Department of Veterans Affairs Adjudication, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 208, 216
(2009).
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heard more veterans law cases on purely legal questions, the Veterans Court’s
fact deference practices are unchecked and unreviewable due to the limited
Federal Circuit jurisdiction over the Veterans Court. 198 The Federal Circuit
Court’s jurisdiction over Veterans Court judgments is narrowly limited to rules
of law or statute or regulation, 199 and only those laws or regulations the Veterans
Court cites and says it relies on. VA cannot appeal the Veterans Courts’ handling
of fact-finding in Board decisions, or how the Veterans Court applied a law or
regulation that affects the facts in a given case. 200 The Veterans Court’s remands
for ostensibly better reasons and bases are also not reviewable as there is not yet
a final decision to appeal.
For these reasons, the Veterans Court’s treatment of facts and the Board’s
fact-finding, for all practical purposes, become the law of the case to be
understood to the extent possible and, to that extent, to be followed. This leaves
the Veterans Court to self-police its fact deference to Board decisions. This
Article urges the Veterans Court to examine its current practices and to guard
against techniques or logical fallacies that would lure the court toward anything
less than clear error deference to the Board’s fact-finding.

198. The Federal Circuit “may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a
challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d);
Andino v. Nicholson, 498 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating, when vacating and remanding
the Veterans Court’s affirmation of Board decision that a letter was sufficient evidence to sever
service connection, but not finding clear error because the case involved a weighing of the evidence,
that “making credibility determinations or weighing evidence” involves fact finding that “is beyond
our jurisdiction.” “Even with a mountain of evidence which contradicts a fact finding, we cannot
disturb this finding on appeal.”); Prinkey v. Shinseki, 735 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding
that the Federal Circuit did not have jurisdiction to review the facts underlying an assessment of
CUE by the Veterans Court).
199. For an overview of Federal Circuit jurisprudence regarding veterans’ law, see Victoria
Hadfield Moshiashwili, Ending the Second “Splendid Isolation”?: Veterans Law at the Federal
Circuit in 2013, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 1437, 1449 (2014).
200. Id.

